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Introduction
The term Hybrid War or Warfare (HW) rose to prominence in 
defense and policy circles as well as in the media after the Russian 
annexation of Crimea in 2014. It was dragged out from the rela-
tive obscurity of military theory circles to become a mainstream 
term used to describe a myriad of seemingly different security and 
defense challenges to the West. The invention of new terms (or the 
adaptation of old ones) to describe and explain the challenges we 
face is a common tendency among security and defense analysts 
and practitioners. And like many new terms that become widely 
used, HW has received a substantial amount of criticism. Largely 
because the concept was deduced from looking at the enemy, 
thus shifting its definition and meaning according to the subject 
of analysis, HW lacks conceptual clarity. It has been attacked for 
being a catch-all phrase or a buzzword with limited analytical 
value that does not contain anything distinctly new. It is also criti-
cized for distorting the traditional distinctions between peace, 
conflict and war, and for being stretched so broad as to become 
conceptually synonymous with grand strategy itself. Just how 
far to extend the concept of HW to include the full spectrum of 
conflict without denuding it of its utility – or breaking the mean-
ing of war by slipping into a broader discussion of coercion and 
competition—is still an open and heated question debate. While 
these criticisms remain valid, it is also clear that the literature on 
HW, as well as its critics, provide fertile grounds for discussing the 
future of war and warfare as well as broader security and defense 
challenges to which the West currently lack responses.
In addition to being a useful concept to describe current and 
future security challenges, HW is a valuable way of describ-
ing the intellectual challenges adversaries are bringing to the 
table in terms of what war is and how it should be understood. 
While the West is largely stuck in an instrumentalist, technicist, 
battle-centric and kinetic understanding of war, its opponents 
have been busy redefining war. The lack of conceptual clarity is 
a problem for HW, but so is the lack of agreement on what war 
is, how its character is evolving, and what this means for distinc-
tions between peace, conflict and war.
 
Much of this problem stems from the fact that Western military 
theory has only a loose understanding of what war itself amounts 
to. Following Clausewitz, there is an understanding of war as 
being political in nature and instrumental in character. But war is 
also an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will. This then 
gives rise to the question of how to interpret “force.” Suffice it here 
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to point out that HW is more than warfighting but also less than 
grand strategy—the connection of all means and ends in times 
of peace and war. In this Policy Brief, grand strategy is seen as a 
precondition for action at a specific time and place, with HW as the 
application of this strategy. In many ways HW can be distinguished 
from normal or competitive politics only in that the use of force or 
the threat of the use of force plays a central role. In this sense it fits 
more with Clausewitz’s concept of war as an act of force intended 
to compel the enemy to do our will and less with the often apoliti-
cal, battle-centric and kinetic Western understanding of war.
The real issue with hybrid warfare is not so much the problem of 
defining the term as how to clarify the concept so to make it useful. 
Concepts shape not only the content of our communications, but also 
the way we think and act. With the political adaptation of the term 
comes a strong need for conceptual clarity  HW, rather than simply 
debating whether HW is “new” or not, or whether it has any analyti-
cal utility distinct from war or grand strategy. The aim of this policy 
brief is thus to provide some conceptual clarity into the term HW.
Evolution of the HW concept: from non-state to state actors
There is no agreed definition of hybrid warfare. Moreover, the 
meaning and usage of the term itself have shifted considerably 
in the period between 2002 and 2015. Since, as one analyst has 
noted, “the hybrid construct was deduced from looking at the 
enemy,”1 the simple fact that different studies of HW reference 
different wars is itself a source of analytical confusion over the 
meaning and content of the term “hybrid warfare.” This can be 
seen most dramatically in how the concept of HW has evolved 
in Western defense circles, away from a discussion of an alleg-
edly novel way of warfare conducted by non-state actors, and 
towards a similarly novel yet distinct form of warfare conducted 
by states—most notably by Russia in the Ukraine. 
Non-State Hybrid Warfare
HW was originally used to describe the growing sophistication 
and complexity of non-state actors on the battlefield in places 
like Chechnya and Lebanon, and was later applied to Afghani-
stan and Iraq. The term “hybrid” in this non-state actor context 
was used to illustrate how actors such as Hezbollah – previously 
considered the quintessential non-state hybrid threat – combined 
the characteristics of unconventional and conventional warfare 
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with other non-military modes of operation in novel and unfamil-
iar ways that challenged both Western military practice (due to 
perceived effectiveness) and strategic thinking (due to perceived 
unfamiliarity). HW in this sense represented a “blurring” of tradi-
tional Western categories of conventional and irregular warfare.
Various characteristics have been attributed to HW conducted 
by non-state actors. First, these actors exhibit increased levels of 
military sophistication as they move up the capabilities ladder, 
successfully deploying modern weapons systems (like anti-ship 
missiles, UAVs), technologies (cyber, secure communication, 
sophisticated command and control), and tactics (combined 
arms) traditionally understood as being beyond the reach of non-
state adversaries. Combining these newly acquired conventional 
techniques and capabilities with an unconventional skill set – 
and doing so simultaneously and within the same battlespace – is 
seen as a potentially new and defining characteristic of non-state 
HW.2 This emphasis on greater military sophistication and capa-
bilities is one of the key features of non-state actors using HW.
A second core characteristic of non-state HW is the expansion of 
the battlefield beyond the purely military realm, and the growing 
importance of non-military tools. From the perspective of the non-
state actor, this can be viewed as form of horizontal escalation that 
provides asymmetric advantages to non-state actors in a conflict 
with militarily superior (state) actors. One widespread early defini-
tion of HW refers to this horizontal expansion exclusively in terms 
of the coordinated use of terrorism and organized crime. Others 
have pointed to legal warfare (e.g. exploiting law to make military 
gains unachievable on the battlefield) and elements of informa-
tion warfare (e.g. controlling the battle of the narrative and online 
propaganda, recruitment and ideological mobilization).3 A case 
in point here is the sophisticated information warfare capability 
of IS, with the incorporation of a highly successful online propa-
ganda and recruiting campaign into its broader war effort.  
State Hybrid Warfare
Broad and generic similarities between Russian actions in 
Ukraine and previous examples of non-state HW—most notably 
the “blurring” of traditional concepts of warfare, its unfamiliar-
ity, the use of non-military means, and the asymmetric relation-
ship to Western conventional warfighting – have all contributed 
to labeling these Russian actions as HW.4  
State HW involves the full integration of the military and non-mili-
tary means of state power to achieve political goals, in which the use 
of force or the threat of force plays a central role. States with highly 
centralized abilities to coordinate and synchronize their instruments 
of power (government, economy, media, etc.) can create synergistic 
force multiplying effects. Specifically, state HW allows for opera-
tions that “target and exploit the seams” in Western-style liberal 
democratic societies that do not have similar coordinating offices or 
capabilities. To quote one US DoD report, Chinese “Three Warfares is 
challenging for the US because it is a concept executed by an organi-
zation (the General Political Department) that has no analogue in 
the US.”5 Without such an office, or a political mandate, or even a 
philosophical understanding that warfare operates in a coordinated 
fashion along the full spectrum of civilian and military space, West-
ern coordination of a response to HW becomes complicated.
The single critical expansion and alteration of the HW concept 
when applied to states is the strategically innovative use of ambi-
guity. Ambiguity has been usefully defined as “hostile actions 
that are difficult for a state to identify, attribute or publicly define 
as coercive uses of force.”6 Ambiguity is used to complicate or 
undermine the decision-making processes of the opponent. 
It is tailored to make a military response – or even a political 
response – difficult. In military terms, it is designed to fall below 
the threshold of war and to delegitimize (or even render politi-
cally irrational) the ability to respond by military force.7  
These principles of ambiguity can be operationalized in many 
ways, from the tactical to the strategic. At the strategic level, state 
HW is designed to avoid conventional war. It targets perceived 
“red lines” or thresholds of its opponents and operates below 
them; it finds “gray zones” where these red lines are not articu-
lated and exploits these undefended spaces; and it hides its mili-
tary means while emphasizing non-military means to achieve its 
political goals. Ambiguity in the form of plausible deniability can 
be achieved by hiding and denying agency through the use of 
proxies, non-attributable forces (e.g. little green men) and attacks 
(e.g. cyber). It can also be achieved through the use of non-mili-
tary comprehensive state power that is difficult to characterize as 
coercive force, thus limiting the ability to legitimize responses. 
At a broader level, HW is also ambiguous both because it oper-
ates outside of Western perceptions of war as a violent clash of 
kinetic forces, and because it blurs the distinction between war 
and peace and the beginning and end of hostilities. 
The Hybrid Warfare Model
The fact that HW has been applied to describe state-centric and 
non-state-centric versions of HW has increased the conceptual 
haziness of HW. However, through an incorporation of the 
diverse characteristics of state and non-state HW we have cre-
ated a model, although crude, under a single descriptive HW 
concept that is meant to provide conceptual clarity. Our deci-
sion for doing so is both principled and practical. In principle, 
although it is clearly possible to distinguish between state and 
non-state HW (and even actor-specific traits), we also find con-
ceptual similarities that unify non-state actor and state actor HW 
strategy. We believe that the starting point should be agnostic as 
to whether the actor is classified as a state or a non-state actor. 
HW is best understood by focusing on various characteristics of 
the actors’ capabilities and vulnerabilities as well as the ways 
the means are employed and to what effects. This unity of hybrid 
warfare (see below) is built on a number of characteristics: it is 
asymmetric8 and multi-modal along a horizontal and a vertical 
axis, and to varying degrees shares an increased emphasis on 
creativity, ambiguity, and the cognitive elements of war.
The model depicts how a HW actor uses its instruments of power 
(MPECI: military, political, economic, civilian and informa-
tional) across the PMESII (political, military, economic, societal, 
informational and infrastructure) vulnerabilities of a target 
system, to escalate – vertically and horizontally – to achieve the 
desired goals.
2 Frank G. Hoffman, “Hybrid Warfare and Challenges”, Joint Forces Quar-
terly, 52, 1st quarter 2009
3 Andres Munoz and Dov Bachmann, “Hybrid Warfare and Lawfare,” The 
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4 John Vandiver, “SACEUR: Allies must prepare for Russia ‘hybrid war’”, 
Stars and Stripes, September 4, available at: http://www.stripes.com/
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5 Stefan Halper (ed.), “China: The Three Warfares” Report for the Director of 
Office of Net Assessment, DoD, May 2013. 
6 Andrew Mumford and Jack McDonald, “Ambiguous Warfare”, Report pro-
duced for the DCDC, October 2014.  
7 Mumford and McDonald (2014).  
8 Here akin to Liddell Hart’s  “the indirect approach” focusing on avoiding 
the enemy’s strength and probing for weakness. See B.H. Liddell Hart, The 
Strategy of Indirect Approach, London: Faber and Faber, 1929.
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stage (or type of power projection) always follows from the other. 
Escalation will most likely be followed by periods of de-escala-
tion, and vice-versa, to control the operational tempo. Escalation 
and de-escalation will also be calibrated to occur simultaneously 
along different instruments of power. Additionally, horizontal 
escalation of HW may occur in the form of battlefield prepara-
tions (like mapping adversary cyber networks, crafting creative 
legal arguments for future coercive actions, normalizing snap 
military exercises) that may never escalate vertically to a level 
where these tools are actually deployed in an “attack phase.” 
Crucially, much of what is done in the horizontal axis might 
be ambiguous – whether hidden from view (cyber operations), 
conducted with unclear intent (investing in foreign ports), or 
not readily definable as a hostile and aggressive act (instigating 
non¬violent protest) – unless these resources are activated in a 
more explicit or intensified sense wherein the benefits of ambi-
guity are lost – and the conflict is likely to escalate. 
Here we can see how HW complicates the concept of phases 
in several ways. First, it will be hard to discern a beginning or 
indeed an end to hostilities. Second, this blurring of distinctions 
leads to thinking about HW as a form of permanent war in which 
it is increasingly difficult to distinguish between normal legal 
activities, coercive diplomacy and war. This is correct as far as 
the relationship to formal /legal concepts of war and peace is 
concerned, but viewing HW as something permanent results in 
unclear and unrealistic understandings. 
Expansion of the battlefield
In addition to blurring what is considered peace, conflict and 
war, hybrid warfare breaks down the distinction between what 
is and what is not part of the battlefield, by using all available 
means across the PMESII spectrum. HW is both multimodal and 
employed on multiple levels at the same time: that compresses 
the traditional levels of war – tactics, operations and strategy – 
thereby accelerating the tempo at the strategic and tactical levels 
faster than a more conventional actor is able to do. Traditional 
physical spaces such as land, sea, air and space are increasingly 
accompanied by social and built spaces such as the political, eco-
nomic, cultural and infrastructural and cyber. Achieving political 
and strategic objectives is no longer bound solely to traditional 
conventional military means, as the cognitive and psychological 
spaces have become an important aspect of war – if not the most 
important one.10 At the same time, the confluence of political, 
economic, informational, humanitarian and other non-military 
means that can achieve desired strategic effects serves to reduce 
the necessity for deploying hard military power. Instead of mak-
ing the opponent succumb by destroying its military capabilities 
to resist, the main battlespace occurs inside the cognitive spaces 
of key populations (domestic, international and in operational 
area) and key decision- and policymakers, making them, and not 
the military, the main target of operation. 
Though the cognitive elements of war are not a novelty as such – 
it could be argued that they have always played a prominent role 
in wars despite the emphasis put on the material side (apolitical 
and technicist view of war) of wars by Western militaries – they 
assume a much more prominent role in HW. Hybrid warfare is 
as much about the primacy of “influence operations” as it is 
8 Here akin to Liddell Hart’s  “the indirect approach” focusing on avoiding 
the enemy’s strength and probing for weakness. See B.H. Liddell Hart, The 
Strategy of Indirect Approach, London: Faber and Faber, 1929.
9 Janis Berzins, “Russia’s New Generation Warfare in Ukraine: Implications 
for Latvian Defense Policy”, National Defense Academy of Latvia, Center 
for Security and Strategic Research, Policy Paper, No.2, April 2014.
Rather than an attrition based understanding of warfare where one 
matches the strength of the other and slowly tries to degrade the 
opponent militarily, HW is characterized by the tailored use of all 
instruments of power against the vulnerabilities of the opponent’s 
system. These instruments can be divided into the more traditional 
MPECI categories, but will be used in synchronized and coordi-
nated fashion against the opponent’s system centers of gravity, 
critical functions and vulnerabilities (PMESII). The goal will be to 
effect a change in the behavioral or physical state of a system or 
elements in the system, according to the political goals. In this, HW 
is similar to how Western military theory thinks about the Compre-
hensive Approach and Effects Based Operations EBO/EBAO. 
Vertical and horizontal escalation
As such, “hybrid” refers not only to the means (or combination of 
means), but also to how these are employed in a highly coordinated 
and synchronized fashion to create synergistic effects beyond the 
immediate element of power. This synchronization has the effect of 
acting as a force multiplier. This, in turn, assumes that HW requires 
or at least can leverage a high degree of centralized operational 
command and control and strategic coordination of the elements 
of power, and not only a unity of effort among the elements. As 
the figure shows, the means (the elements of power) may be verti-
cally escalated or de-escalated (increased/decreased intensity), or 
horizontally escalated or de-escalated (synchronization of elements 
of power creating effects that can have the same impact as verti-
cal escalation of one mean, without necessarily overstepping the 
opponent’s response thresholds) – or a combination of the two, to 
achieve a goal. For instance, one could vertically escalate the politi-
cal spectrum of the PMESII while horizontally escalating into other 
spectrums such as the informational and military. By employing all 
elements of national power, the ability to escalate vertically and 
horizontally increases, and thus also the ability to create effects. 
Phases
Several studies of HW have used phases to explain how HW func-
tions—especially in a Russian HW context. For instance, Berzins 
has cited Russian military writers (Tchekinov and Bogdanov) to 
describe an eight-phase model of HW that emphasizes the non-
kinetic and cognitive/psychological aspects of HW that precede 
the kinetic.9 Phases are a traditional way of thinking about war 
in which the events are seen as following a linear causal trajec-
tory towards a given end. Although phases are useful for thinking 
about HW, if the concept is too stringently applied, certain impor-
tant aspects of HW may become obscured or under-emphasized. 
Because an HW campaign can operate along both the vertical and 
the horizontal escalation axes, it is unlikely that such a campaign 
will consistently follow a linear and causal trajectory where one 
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about hard military power. This does not mean that hard military 
power does not play a large role in HW (in deterring and control-
ling escalation for instance) – but that the will to fight back at 
the HW actor is as much determined by how key populations 
and decision-makers perceive the situation as by brute military 
power. While all the individual elements of power may be well 
known, the synchronized, combined approach to influence the 
cognitive spaces adds a new dimension to how coercion, aggres-
sion, conflict and war are understood.
Actual implementation of the instruments of power will hinge on 
the capabilities of the HW actor and on the perceived vulnerabili-
ties of the opponent, the political goals of the hybrid actor, and its 
planned ways of achieving those goals. As with all conflicts and 
wars, the shape the HW will take depends on the context. HW is 
conducted by both state and non-state actors, but state actors will 
usually have a broader array of sophisticated instruments avail-
able and can thus be more able to escalate vertically and horizon-
tally. They also differ significantly in how they apply their means. 
The similarities are in the way that both use their instruments in 
synchronized fashion against the perceived vulnerabilities of an 
opponent across the PMESII spectrum. In this sense, non-state 
and state use of HW can be seen as two different models of the 
same phenomenon, where the means and ways differ.
Because the instruments of power that an HW actor may leverage 
against an opponent’s weaknesses are highly contextual, it is dif-
ficult to provide a generic list of instruments for HW. In addition, 
breaking up these instruments into neat groups does not explain 
the ways in which a HW actor may be organized. For instance, in 
many HW actors there may not be a clear dividing line between 
the military, the political and the civilian. Although all these ele-
ments can be studied separately, it is essential to recognize that 
the different elements of power occur in multiple dimensions and 
on multiple levels in a synchronized and synergistic fashion, tai-
lored to the perceived vulnerabilities of the target system to create 
cognitive and/or physical effects. That makes it more important 
to comprehend the synergistic effects and not only the functional 
capabilities of the HW actor. Understanding how these are linked 
and how they are used to shift among material and cognitive 
approaches through vertical and horizontal escalation or de-
escalation to create effects is crucial in order to counter HW.
Conclusion
Due to the lack of conceptual clarity, hybrid warfare (HW) has 
been exposed to harsh criticism. While much of the criticism 
is valid, HW has utility beyond the mere fact that it produces 
valuable thinking about current and future security and 
defense challenges. This policy brief has provided clarity to 
the concept by combining the seemingly opposed notions of 
state and non-state use of HW into one model of HW. Analyz-
ing the literature on HW and case studies of actors described 
as HW actors, we have identified several common charac-
teristics that make up the model of HW. Despite the many 
differences, there are similarities among the actors in how 
they use their instruments of power against the opponent’s 
perceived vulnerabilities in order to create synergistic effects. 
This can offer greater conceptual clarity with regard to HW, 
but should not be read as a blueprint for action. It is meant 
as a common starting point for further discussion on the 
future security environment and how to deter, mitigate and 
counter HW threats, from states or non-state actors. We must 
think broadly about security and defense challenges. Many 
of these lie outside of the traditional military domain, and 
we lack readily available ideas on how to respond to them.
Moreover, the creative and adaptive use of all instruments of 
power by our adversaries means that it may be more impor-
tant to focus on our own vulnerabilities and the synergistic 
effects, rather than on the functional capabilities of the HW 
actor on its own. The concept of HW provides an analytical 
language that allows for flexibility in approaching how to 
think about and operate in the future security environment. 
That being said, however, HW should not be seen as a substi-
tute for thorough and contextual understanding of different 
actors and challenges when strategic choices are to be made. 
HW describes the problem, not a solution.9 See for instance Richard Szafranski, “Neocortical Warfare?  The Acme of 
Skill,” Military Review, November 1994, pp. 41–55.
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